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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
C • R • , 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040281CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a juvenile court adjudication on one 
count of wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree 
felony if committed by an adult (R. 30-31) . This court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(c)(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where the state established that the crime was committed 
in Uintah County, did the trial court commit reversible error in 
allocating to the juvenile the burden of proving that he was 
Indian, in order to except himself from state jurisdiction? 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the 
juvenile, who called himself a Uintah Band member of the Indians 
of Utah Territory, was not legally Indian and was, therefore, 
subject to state jurisdiction? j 
Trial court jurisdictional rulings are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, 15, 
11 P.3d 709 (citing State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 4 
1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)). 
3. Did the trial court properly reject mistake of law as a 
defense to the destruction of protected wildlife where the 
written opinions on which the juvenile purportedly relied either 
did not fall within the purview of the statute governing mistake 
1 
or were not legally relevant to the crime charged? 
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court ruling 
i 
below. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992), overruled 
on other grounds. State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106 (Utah 
2003); State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, 16, 57 P.3d 1134.
 1 
4. Did the trial court properly reject the defense of 
infancy to a juvenile court adjudication? 
"Whether a defense is without merit is a question of law i 
that we review for correctness." Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 
P.2d 1206, 1211 (Utah App. 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (West 2004), governing penalties 
for wanton destruction of protected wildlife, provides that: 
(1) A person is guilty of wanton destruction 
of protected wildlife if that person: 
-2-
(a) commits an act in violation of . . 
Section 23-20-3(1); 
(c) (i) does so with intentional, 
knowing, or reckless conduct . . . 
(3) Wanton destruction of wildlife is punishable: 
(a) as a third degree felony if: 
(ii) a trophy animal was captured, 
injured, or destroyed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-3 (West 2004), governing taking or 
transporting protected wildlife, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Except as provided in this title or a 
rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife 
Board, a person may not: 
(a) take. . . 
(i) protected wildlife or their parts; 
(b) transport . . . protected wildlife or 
their parts; 
(d) possess protected wildlife . . . 
unaccompanied by a valid license, permit, 
[or] tag . . . 
(2) Possession of protected wildlife without 
a valid license, permit, [or] tag . . . is 
prima facie evidence that the protected 
wildlife was illegally taken and is illegally 
held in possession. 
-3-
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304(2) (West 2004), governing mistake 
of law, provides in pertinent part: 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the 
existence or meaning of a penal law is no 
defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or 
mistake, the actor reasonably 
believed his conduct did not 
constitute an offense; and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake 
resulted from the actor's 
reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of 
the law contained in a written 
order or grant of permission by an 
administrative agency charged by 
law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law in question; 
or 
(ii) A written interpretation 
of the law contained in an opinion 
of a court of record or made by a 
public servant charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The juvenile was originally charged by petition in juvenile 
court with one count of wanton destruction of protected wildlife, 
a class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult (R. 174). The 
juvenile filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R. 
155, 118-52). After extensive briefing on issues related to 
jurisdiction, the court denied the motion (R. 32 at addendum A). 
The juvenile was tried to the court, which determined that the 
petition was true (R. 22-24 at addendum B). Disposition was 
stayed, pending the outcome of this timely appeal (R. 7; R. 24 at 
addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the 2002 deer hunt, a truck pulled up to a checkpoint 
near the Book Cliffs in Uintah County where the Utah Division of 
Wildlife Resources was checking for chronic wasting disease (R. 
2: 11). There was a large mule deer buck in the truck bed, but 
no state hunting tag attached to the animal (Id. at 12, 22) . The 
juvenile and his son, as well as two other relatives, were in the 
truck (IcL at 16). 
The juvenile told a conservation officer that he had killed 
his first deer (Id. at 22). His father corroborated that the boy 
was the shooter (Id. at 25). 
Based on this evidence, the juvenile was charged by petition 
in juvenile court with wanton destruction of wildlife (R. 2-3). 
Before trial, the petition was amended to a third degree felony 
if committed by an adult because the animal was a trophy deer, 
statutorily defined as "any buck with an outside antler 
measurement of 24 inches or greater." Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-
2(46)(a)(West 2004). The parties stipulated to the size of the 
antler spread (R. 27). The juvenile a motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction, accompanied by a lengthy pre-trial memorandum 
(R. 118-55). After the motions had been briefed, heard, and 
denied, the juvenile stood trial, and the court found the 
petition to be true (R. 22-24). The court stayed disposition 
-5-
pending the outcome of this timely appeal (R. 7; R. 24 at 
addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The juvenile has organized his lengthy appellate brief into 
three issues and six sub-issues, with 14 sub-parts included 
within the sub-issues, 2 sub-sub-parts, and 4 sub-sub-sub-parts. 
See Br. of Aplt. at i-iii. In the interests of efficiency and 
clarity, the state has reframed the juvenile's claims. 
First, the juvenile court did not err in ruling that the 
juvenile must carry the burden of proving his Indian status in 
order to defeat state court jurisdiction. Once the state 
established that the crime occurred in Uintah County, it had 
carried its burden of establishing jurisdiction. The burden then 
shifted to the juvenile to demonstrate an exception by showing a 
particular reason why the federal courts should assume 
jurisdiction instead. 
Second, the trial court correctly ruled that the juvenile 
was not Indian for the purpose of establishing an exception to 
state criminal jurisdiction. Where the juvenile conceded that 
the crime occurred in Uintah County and where he did not adduce 
evidence that would invoke the federal government's interest in 
the special relationship it maintains with certain Indian people, 
the state properly retained jurisdiction. Nothing about the 
juvenile's assertion that he is a Uintah Band member of the 
Indians of Utah Territory or about the effect of the Utah 
Partition Act changes this result. 
Third, the trial court correctly refused to admit evidence 
about the juvenile's alleged mistake of law in relying on a 
resolution issued by the Ute Tribal Business Committee and on two 
opinions issued by the Tenth Circuit for the belief that he was 
excepted from the law forbidding hunting without a state permit. 
This issue is inadequately briefed and, on this ground alone, the 
Court may decline to consider it. Even so, the argument fails 
because the Ute Tribal Business Committee resolution fell outside 
the purview of the mistake statute and the two cases on which the 
juvenile purportedly relied were not relevant. Consequently, any 
reliance on them would have been unreasonable. 
Finally, the juvenile seeks to invoke the "common law rule 
of infancy" as a defense to the criminal charge of taking 
protected wildlife without a state hunting permit. Because the 
juvenile's case was adjudicated in juvenile court - a civil court 
exercising equitable powers only - and did not result in a 
criminal conviction, the juvenile court correctly rejected his 
claim of incompetency based on his youth. 
ARGUMENT 
The central issue the juvenile raises in his appellate brief 
is jurisdictional in nature. The law is well-settled that 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by either 
party or the Court. State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 
-7-
1992)• Plainly, "when subject matter jurisdiction does not 
exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill 
that void." Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citation omitted). This appeal focuses almost entirely on 
jurisdictional issues raised prior to trial and concluding that 
the juvenile court had jurisdiction. Notably, the substantive 
issue at trial, whether the juvenile wantonly destroyed protected 
wildlife by shooting a trophy deer without a state hunting 
permit, is not at issue on appeal. 
POINT ONE 
THE JUVENILE COURT CORRECTLY 
CONCLUDED THAT THE JUVENILE MUST 
CARRY THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING 
HIS INDIAN STATUS; IN ANY EVENT, 
BECAUSE IT WAS UNDISPUTED THAT THE 
JUVENILE WAS 31/32 NON-INDIAN BY 
BLOOD, ANY ERROR IN THE COURT'S 
ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
WAS HARMLESS 
The juvenile argues that the trial court erred in ruling 
that he must carry the burden of proving his Indian status in 
order to defeat state court jurisdiction. See Br. of Aplt. at 
65; R. 32 at addendum A. The juvenile's argument lacks merit. 
The trial court reached a correct legal conclusion. While 
the state bore the initial burden of proving that the crime was 
committed in Utah, once it established that fact, the burden then 
shifted to the juvenile to establish that he fit within an 
exception that would preclude the state from exercising 
jurisdiction. 
The issue of who bears the burden of proving that a 
defendant or a victim is either Indian or non-Indian has been a 
source of some debate among the federal circuits. Although 
courts disagree about who bears the burden of proving a defendant 
is not Indian, they nonetheless seem to agree that, in order to 
invoke federal jurisdiction for a crime committed in Indian 
Country, the federal government must at least establish that 
either the defendant or the victim is Indian.1 Compare United 
States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d at 971, 978 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(federal government must prove the Indian/non-Indian status of 
both the defendant and the victim because this status will 
"determin[e] whether a federal court has jurisdiction" and under 
what statute jurisdiction is derived); United States v. Torres, 
733 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1984)(government must prove not only 
that defendants are Indian but also that victim was non-Indian) 
with United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 
2005)(federal government must prove the Indian status of either 
defendant or victim, but need not prove non-Indian status of 
either); United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 
1983)(government need not allege non-Indian status of defendant 
in an indictment under section 1152 and does not have burden of 
going forward on that issue). 
1
 For a definition of "Indian Country," see 18. U.S.C. 
§1151 at addendum E. 
-9-
Under Utah law, it is clear that the state bears the burden 
of establishing the trial court's jurisdiction over a defendant. 
See generally State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah App. 
1988)(in proving offense of consumption, state bore burden of 
establishing jurisdictional factor that at least some alcohol was 
consumed in Utah; failure to do so required reversal); see also 
Newavs, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422-24 (Utah 1997) 
(when faced with defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, state bore burden of establishing jurisdiction 
under specific guidelines). 
To establish a state trial court's authority to hear a case, 
the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that some element of the charged offense was committed in Utah. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1) (West 2005) (listing the various 
methods by which a crime may be committed "wholly or partly 
within the state," thereby subjecting the actor to state court 
jurisdiction); see also State v. Pavne, 892 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Utah 
1995) (applying preponderance standard to jurisdictional 
questions, which must be decided by trial court rather than 
jury). If the state, then, shows by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the offense was committed in Utah, it has met its 
burden with regard to jurisdiction. In this case, the parties 
agreed and the trial court found that the crime was committed in 
Uintah County (R. 22 at addendum B; R. 125). 
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Once the state establishes its jurisdiction, the burden 
shifts to defendant to prove circumstances that would deny the 
court of jurisdiction. This view is buttressed by case law. In 
State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that "[defendant] carried his burden of factually 
establishing that he has been 'recognized racially' as a Ute 
Indian." Id. at 933 (emphasis added).2 
The legislative history of Utah's jurisdiction statute 
further bolsters the correctness of Perank's statement that the 
defendant must prove that he qualifies for an exception to. 
jurisdiction. Recognizing that the case law on this issue has 
been less than clear, the legislature recently amended the 
jurisdictional statute to "clarif[y] procedures for challenging 
the state's jurisdiction to prosecute an offense." S.B. 119, 
General Session (2004) (enacted). Under the amended statute, 
once the state 
establish[es] jurisdiction over the offense . 
. . by showing . . . that the offense was 
committed either wholly or partly within the 
borders of the state, . . . the burden is 
upon the defendant to prove, [that] defendant 
2
 This Court has ruled inconsistently on the issue. In 
State v. Haqen, this Court cited Sorenson and held that "the 
prosecution was required to prove jurisdiction, i.e., that 
defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a preponderance of 
evidence." 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (reversed on 
other ground). In contrast, three years earlier, another panel 
held that "[defendant] had the burden to persuade the trial court 
that he was an 'Indian' within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1152-1153." State v. Lucero, No. 860213-CA (Utah App. Aug. 
27, 1987) (unpublished memorandum decision at addendum D). The 
correctness of Haqen is undermined by Perank, cited above. 
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is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe . . 
. and that the facts establish that the crime 
is one that vests jurisdiction in tribal or 
federal court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(5) (West 2004). While the statute was 
amended after the present case arose, the legislature made clear 
that its intent was to "clarify" the law rather than change its 
essential nature. 
Indeed, when the legislature adds a clarifying provision to 
a statute, that provision generally takes retroactive effect. 
See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah 1988) P[w]hen a 
statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive evidence of the 
legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended 
statute") overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393 (Utah 1994); Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 150-51 
(Utah 1979); Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 
208, 210-11 (Utah 1974) (a statute or amendment that "deals only 
with clarification or amplification as to how the law should have 
been understood prior to its enactment" applies retroactively). 
Moreover, placing the burden of proof on the juvenile 
comports with the rule adopted in other states that have 
addressed the issue. See Arizona v. Verdugo, 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("we hold that the burden to show facts 
that would establish the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, 
because of exclusive federal jurisdiction under [§§ 1152 or 
1153], is on defendant, not the state"); Pendleton v. Nevada, 734 
P.2d 693, 695 (Nev. 1987) ("[o]nce the state produces evidence 
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that the crime took place in the county, it is incumbent upon the 
defendant to prove that the incident took place on lands over 
which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction"); New Mexico 
v. Cutnose, 532 P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) ("[t]he burden 
was upon defendant to demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the 
district court"); Oklahoma v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401, 403 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1989) (disagreeing with defendant's argument that "he 
has no affirmative duty to prove his status as an Indian" in 
attempting to defeat state jurisdiction)/ Vermont v. St. Francis, 
563 A.2d 249, 251 (Vt. 1989) (holding that defendant has "the 
burden of proving they are Indians"); Washington v. Daniels, 16 
P.3d 650, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("person claiming to be 
Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction must show (1) that 
he is an Indian in the racial sense, and (2) that he is enrolled 
or affiliated with a [federally-recognized tribe] and is 
individually subject to United States jurisdiction"). 
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred 
in finding that the juvenile must carry the burden of proving his 
Indian status, the error was harmless. "^Harmless' errors are 
^errors which . . . are sufficiently inconsequential that we 
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Verder 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989)). 
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Here, there was no dispute that the juvenile was 31/32 non-
Indian by blood. See R. 32 at addendum A. Thus, even if the 
court erred in ruling that the juvenile must carry the burden of 
proof, that alleged error would have made no difference to the 
determination that he did not legally qualify as Indian. See 
Point Two, infra. Consequently, any error in allocating the 
burden of proof was harmless. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE JUVENILE, WHO CLAIMED TO 
BE A SHOSHONE INDIAN OF UTAH 
TERRITORY, WAS NOT LEGALLY INDIAN 
FOR PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION AND WAS, THEREFORE, 
SUBJECT TO STATE JURISDICTION 
The juvenile's jurisdictional argument is multi-faceted and 
complex. Reducing the argument to its simplest terms, he asserts 
that because he is Indian and the crime was committed in Indian 
Country, the state cannot exercise jurisdiction over his case. 
Jurisdiction over hunting and fishing in Indian Country, he 
contends, rests exclusively with the federal government. See Br. 
of Aplt. at 20-23.3 
3
 This claim is incorrect ab initio. An Indian who is 
charged with a criminal hunting violation may be subject to 
tribal and/or federal jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4); 
United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 534 
U.S. 1115 (2001) (Indian tribes have inherent criminal 
jurisdiction over non-member Indians); 18 U.S.C. § 1165. The 
incorrectness of the juvenile's assertion, however, is peripheral 
here because the juvenile is not an Indian for purposes of 
criminal jurisdiction. 
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tribes. That is, federal "regulation is rooted in the unique 
status of Indians as *a separate people' with their own political 
institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is 
governance of once-sovereign political communities." United 
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). Thus, " w'in 
dealing with Indians the Federal Government is dealing primarily 
not with a particular race as such but with members of certain 
social-political groups towards which the Federal Government has 
assumed special responsibilities.'"" LaPier v. McCormick, 986 
F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v. Heath, 509 
F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted)). 
The federal government assumes these "special 
responsibilities" only under specific circumstances. For 
example, where either the perpetrator or victim of a crime 
committed in Indian Country meets the legal definition of Indian, 
the federal interest in the crime and its consequences would 
mandate federal jurisdiction and preclude state jurisdiction.4 
See St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.S.D. 
1988) (citing D. Getches & C. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law 412-
15 (2d ed. 1986)). The state, in turn, exercises criminal 
jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian Country only when 
4
 The juvenile also tries to bootstrap into federal 
jurisdiction by asserting that the "victim" of his crime was the 
Ute Tribe. See Br. of Aplt. at 27-29. The juvenile, however, 
has no standing to assert rights on the Tribe's behalf. Murdock, 
132 F.3d at 542. 
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The crime in this case was committed in Uintah County on 
land that is "Indian Country." See R. 22; 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
(defining Indian Country) at addendum C. Because the land on 
which the crime occurred was Indian Country, the pivotal inquiry 
for purposes of determining jurisdiction is whether the juvenile 
meets the legal definition of Indian. If he fails to qualify as 
"Indian," then the state properly exercised jurisdiction. 
The Court may find the following chart useful in 
understanding how jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian 
Country is allocated: 
Crimes by Parties Jurisdiction 
1. By Indians against Indians: 
a. "Major" crimes Federal or Tribal 
(concurrent) 
b. Other crimes Tribal (exclusive) 
2. By Indians against non-Indians: 
a. "Major" crimes . Federal or Tribal 
(concurrent) 
b. Other crimes Federal or Tribal 
(concurrent) 
3. By Indians without Victims: Tribal (exclusive) 
4. By non-Indians against Indians: Federal (exclusive) 
5. By non-Indians against non-Indians: State (exclusive) 
6. By non-Indians without Victims: State (exclusive) 
Canby, William, American Indian Law, 168 (3d ed. 1998). 
Underlying all determinations of jurisdiction for crimes 
committed in Indian Country is the nature of the relationship 
between the federal government and federally-recognized Indian 
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Indian interests, which would implicate a federal responsibility, 
are absent. See State v. Sorkhabi, 46 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Ariz, Ct. 
App. 2002) (state's jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian 
Country by non-Indians in victimless crimes or against non-
Indians "is based on the fact that Asuch crimes do not involve 
essential tribal relations or affect the rights of 
Indians'")(citation omitted). 
A. The juvenile is not Indian for purposes of criminal 
jurisdiction over a crime committed in Indian Country. 
The dispositive jurisdictional inquiry for a crime committed 
in Indian Country begins with whether the juvenile meets the 
legal definition of "Indian."5 If he does, then federal interests 
are implicated and the state is precluded from exercising 
jurisdiction. 
For purposes of criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed 
in Indian Country, the genesis of a test for determining whether 
either a perpetrator or a victim is Indian was first articulated 
in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1846). Through 
subsequent state and federal court rulings, this analysis has 
evolved into a two-part test: 
"Two elements must be satisfied before it can 
be found that [a defendant or victim] is 
Indian under federal law. Initially, it must 
appear that he has a significant percentage 
5
 The matter is inherently complex because the definition 
of "Indian" may vary, depending on the context for which identity 
as an Indian is relevant. State v. Perank, 858 P.2d at 927, 932 
n.6 (Utah 1992)(citing Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law 19-20 (1982). 
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of Indian blood. Secondly, the [defendant] 
must be recognized as an Indian either by the 
federal government or by some tribe or 
society of Indians." Goforth v. State, 644 
P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. 1982). 
State v. Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 n.2, (Utah App. 1990), reversed 
on other grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992); accord Perank, 858 
P.2d at 932. This test has been used by many courts, both 
federal and state. See, e.g., United States v. Prentiss, 273 
F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kevs, 103 F.3d 
758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); Scrivner v. Tansv, 68 F.3d 1234, 1241 
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th 
Cir. 1995); United State v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 
1984); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D. 
1988); State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 23-27 (Conn. 1997); State 
v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont. 1990); State v. Atteberv, 519 
P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974); State v. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d 83, 85 (ID 
Ct. App. 1988). 
In this case, the trial court found that the juvenile 
carried 1/32 Indian blood (R. 32 at addendum A). In assessing 
what quantum of Indian blood satisfies the first prong of the 
Rogers test, most courts require at least 1/4 Indian blood. 
Venzia v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th Cir. 1917)(1/4 to 3/8 
found sufficient); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d at 986-87 (165/512 
found sufficient); State v. Haoen, 802 P.2d at 747 (5/16 found 
sufficient); Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 440 P.2d 442, 
444 (Wash. 1968)(1/4 found sufficient); cf. Goforth v. State, 644 
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P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (slightly less than 1/4 
found insufficient). Courts have differed on whether l/8th 
Indian blood is sufficient to satisfy the first Rogers prong. 
Compare Sully v. United States, 195 F.113, 117, 129 (8th Cir. 
1912) (1/8 held sufficient) with Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 
77,80 (Wyo. 1982)(1/8 held insufficient). The State could find 
no cases holding that 1/32 Indian blood constitutes a 
"significant amount" of Indian blood sufficient to fulfill the 
first prong of the Rogers test. Under the first prong of Rogers, 
then, the juvenile does not carry a sufficient quantum of Indian 
blood to qualify as an Indian for purposes of invoking a federal 
interest in criminal jurisdiction. 
The analysis need not go further. The juvenile is not an 
Indian under the accepted legal standard and the state, 
consequently, has jurisdiction over his crime even though it 
occurred in Indian Country. An examination of the second Rogers 
prong, while not necessary, further demonstrates how far the 
juvenile is from qualifying as Indian for federal jurisdictional 
purposes. 
The second prong of the Rogers test, focusing not on race 
but on recognition as an Indian by a tribe or the federal 
government, was comprehensively analyzed in St. Cloud v. United 
States, 702 F. Supp. 1456. There, the court examined "whether 
the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a 
formerly sovereign people." St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461. 
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Reviewing existing case law, the St. Cloud court gleaned four 
factors to analyze: 
In declining order of importance, these 
factors are: 1) enrollment in a tribe; 2) 
government recognition formally and 
informally through providing the person 
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) 
enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and 
4) social recognition as an Indian through 
living on a reservation and participating in 
Indian social life. 
Id. at 14 61. These factors, the court noted, are intended not to 
establish "a precise formula," but rather to "guide the analysis 
of whether a person is recognized as an Indian." Id. 
As to the first factor, enrollment in a tribe, juvenile 
calls himself a Uintah Band member of the Shoshone Indians of 
Utah Territory (R. 118, 123; Br. of Aplt. at 7, 10). While the 
juvenile asserts membership in this group, he has not adduced any 
proof either that the group in which he asserts membership is, 
indeed, a tribal entity or that he is, in fact, a member of it. 
The juvenile has thus failed to establish that he is "enrolled in 
a tribe" for purposes of fulfilling the second prong of the 
Rogers test. 
Second, no evidence was adduced that the federal government 
ever recognized the juvenile as Indian by providing him with 
benefits or services reserved only for Indians. 
Third, the only record evidence that the juvenile benefitted 
from tribal affiliation of any sort was that he possessed a 
Timpanogos Tribe hunting permit when he was apprehended with the 
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trophy buck (R. 23 at addendum B; R. 188). While the juvenile 
may have claimed an association with the Timpanogos Tribe at some 
time, he now claims only to be a Shoshone Indian of Utah 
Territory (Br. of Aplt. at 7, 10).6 
The final factor is the juvenile's social recognition as an 
Indian, including such considerations as living on a reservation 
and participating in an Indian social lifestyle. The record 
contains no evidence to support this factor. 
The record before this Court, then, does not support either 
prong of the Rogers test. The trial court thus correctly 
concluded that the juvenile was not Indian for purposes of 
federal jurisdiction (R. 32 at addendum A). Accordingly, the 
state properly exercised jurisdiction over his case. 
B. The juvenile's claimed affiliation as a Uintah Band member 
of the Indians of Utah Territory does not provide him with 
an independent, aboriginal right to hunt free from state, 
tribal or federal jurisdiction. 
The juvenile eschews the Rogers test, claiming instead that, 
based upon his purported membership in the Uintah Band of the 
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, he possesses an aboriginal 
right to hunt, unregulated, in Indian Country. The Uintah Band, 
he claims, while eventually incorporating with two other bands to 
become the Ute Indian Tribe, retained all the rights it formerly 
6
 And, indeed, claiming Timpanogos Tribe identification 
would get him no further than his current claim. See Timpanogos 
Tribe v. Conway, case no. 2:00-CV-734 TC, Order at 11 (January 
25, 2005) (holding that Timpanogos Tribe has no legal identity 
separate and apart from Ute Tribe) at addendum G. 
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possessed as a separate Shoshone Band (Br. of Aplt. at 29-37). 
The juvenile concludes that his right to hunt thus predates the 
existence of the Ute Tribe and exists wholly apart from the Ute 
Tribe, coming as it does from his Shoshone ancestors who were 
Uintah Band members (Id. at 35-37). 
The juvenile's argument was unequivocally rejected by the 
federal courts in United States v. Murdock, 919 F.Supp. 1534 (D. 
Utah 1996), aff'd, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 
Murdock v. United States, 525 U.S. 810 (1998). -In that case, 
Perry Murdock, the son of two "mixed-bloods" terminated from the 
Ute Indian Tribe under the Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677a 
et seq., claimed the right to hunt and fish on the Reservation 
because he was a member of the Uintah Band. See Murdock, 919 
F.Supp at 1540-42; 132 F.3d at 540-41. In affirming the district 
court's holding that Murdock did not retain aboriginal hunting 
and fishing rights through the Uintah Band, the Tenth Circuit 
held: 
The [Ute Tribe's] Constitution thus makes 
clear that the Bands ceased to exist 
separately outside the Ute Tribe, that 
jurisdiction over what was formerly the 
territory of the Uintah Band was to be 
exercised by the Ute Tribe, and that the 
rights formerly vested in the Uintah Band 
were to be defined by the Ute Constitution 
and exercised by the Ute Tribe. In light of 
these provisions, [Murdock's] argument that 
the Uintah Band's hunting and fishing rights 
retain a separate existence and belong only 
to the Uintah Band is groundless. Even if 
[Murdock] is correct that the Uintah Band 
continues to maintain its own identity, under 
the Ute Constitution the Band does so only 
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within the context of the Ute Tribe. 
Accordingly, [Murdock] has no right of user 
in hunting and fishing rights originally 
granted to the Uintah Tribe. 
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541/ cf. Timpanoaos Tribe v. Conway, case 
no. 2:00-CV-734 TC, Order at 11 (January 25, 2005) at addendum E 
(citing favorably the testimony of two experts who concluded 
"that the Timpanogos merged with the Utes many years ago, that 
presently there is no separate tribe known as the Timpanogos 
Tribe, . . . and that the Timpanogos, other than as members of 
the Ute Tribe, have no rights on the Reservation"). 
The juvenile's claim, based on his membership as a Uintah 
Band Shoshone Indian of Utah Territory, is similarly groundless. 
Where the Uintah Band was formally incorporated into the Ute 
Tribe, hunting and fishing rights originally accorded Uintah Band 
members no longer retain a separate existence from the Ute Tribe. 
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541. The juvenile's claim of a separate 
hunting right premised upon the Uintah Band's retained aboriginal 
rights thus fails for the same reasons Murdock's identical claim 
failed before the federal courts. 
C. The issues that the juvenile briefs with respect to the Ute 
Partition Act are not the subject of any trial court rulings 
and, hence, are not properly before this Court for review. 
Defendant devotes 19 pages of his appellate brief to various 
arguments related to the Ute Partition Act which, ironically, he 
describes at the outset as an analytical "red herring" to the 
merits of his case. See Br. of Aplt. at 40-59. Nowhere in his 
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brief does he connect his arguments with any trial court ruling. 
And, indeed, a thorough review of all of the juvenile court's 
rulings reveals not a single reference to the Ute Partition Act. 
See R. 22-24, 32, 110-11. 
Where defendant asserts that the Ute Partition Act is not 
relevant to his case and where the juvenile court plainly did not 
rely on it to reach its legal conclusions, there is nothing for 
this Court to review.7 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED 
MISTAKE OF LAW AS A DEFENSE TO THE 
WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTED 
WILDLIFE WHERE THE JUVENILE 
PURPORTEDLY RELIED ON WRITTEN 
STATEMENTS THAT EITHER DID NOT FALL 
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE MISTAKE 
STATUTE OR WERE NOT RELEVANT TO THE 
CRIME CHARGED 
The juvenile argues that the trial court erred when it 
rejected his mistake-of-law defense and, consequently, refused to 
allow evidence in support of what he claimed was his reasonable 
but mistaken belief that he could hunt without a state permit. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 59-62. Specifically, he asserts he relied on 
a resolution by the Ute Tribal Business Committee and on two 
Tenth Circuit opinions. Id. 
7
 The juvenile's claim is even more attenuated than his 
father's identical claim, which fails on the merits. For a 
complete discussion of the Ute Partition Act, the Court may 
choose to reference the brief of appellee in State v. Reber, 
Atkins & Thunehorst, case no. 20040371-CA. 
-24-
This argument fails at the outset for wholly inadequate 
briefing. Nowhere in his short appellate argument does the 
juvenile articulate exactly how the mistake-of-law doctrine 
applies to the facts. The law is well-settled that "to permit 
meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply with the briefing 
requirements sufficiently to ^enable us to understand . . . what 
particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record those 
errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities, those 
errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other 
relief.'" Burns v. Summerhouse, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 
1996)(quoting Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 
App. 1988)). The juvenile's argument fails because he has not 
explained the asserted error in sufficient detail to enable this 
Court to clearly understand its essential nature. 
A further difficulty with the juvenile's appellate brief is 
that he has framed his appellate argument as a due process claim. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 61. The trial court, however, made no 
mention of a constitutional basis for its ruling. R. 32. 
Because the trial court did not rule on constitutional grounds, 
there is no constitutional ruling from which to appeal. State v. 
Richins, 2004 UT App 36, 18, 86 P.3d 759. 
To the extent that the state has successfully gleaned the 
meaning of the juvenile's mistake-of-law argument, it fails. The 
juvenile seems to assert that the juvenile court's rulings that 
he was not Indian and that jurisdiction properly rested with the 
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state proved that he was mistaken in relying on two Tenth Circuit 
opinions and on a Ute Tribal Business Committee resolution.8 Br, 
of Aplt. at 62. Because these statements demonstrate his 
^mistake'" of law, he asserts, they should trigger the 
applicability of mistake as an affirmative defense to the charge 
of wantonly destroying protected wildlife. See Br. of Aplt. at 
65-66 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304). 
The juvenile's argument fails for two reasons: first, 
because he sought to establish a mistake-of-law defense by 
introducing testimony from the Ute Tribal Business Committee that 
did not fit within the parameters of the statute governing 
mistake; and, second, because the two Tenth Circuit cases on 
which he relies are legally irrelevant. 
The statute governing mistake of law provides that the 
mistake must result from reasonable reliance on "a written 
interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of 
record" or on "[a]n official [written] statement of the law . . . 
by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility 
for interpreting the law in question." Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-2-
304(2) (b) (i)-(ii) . 
First, the "law in question" is Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-3 
(West 2004), governing the taking of protected wildlife, and Utah 
8
 The juvenile also asserts that he was relying on his 
father. Br. of Aplt. at 59. But since his father was 
purportedly relying on both the Tenth Circuit opinions and the 
Ute Tribal Business Committee statement as well, this assertion 
will not be dealt with as a separate matter. 
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Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (West 2004), governing penalties for the 
wanton destruction of protected wildlife. The Ute Tribal 
Business Committee, however, is not "an administrative agency 
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in 
question." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304 (2) (b).(i) - (ii) . The 
juvenile, consequently, could not invoke the Committee's 
resolution as a defense to a criminal violation of that law. 
Second, the juvenile purported to rely on two Tenth Circuit 
cases, Timpanoaos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002), 
and Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997). 
Given the procedural posture and holdings of these cases, 
however, they were legally irrelevant. Consequently, any 
reliance on them would have been patently unreasonable. 
Timpanoaos Tribe was an interlocutory appeal from the denial 
of the state's motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 286 F.3d at 1198. In that context, a 
panel of the Tenth Circuit determined that the Timpanogos Tribe 
"may establish federal question jurisdiction in asserting its 
hunting rights'' even though it was not a federally recognized 
tribe.9 Id. at 1203-04. This ruling merely permitted the suit to 
continue; the court granted no other relief at that time. Id. at 
1203-04. Defense counsel, intimately familiar with Conway 
9
 A "federally recognized tribe" is an Indian tribe 
recognized by the United States Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, as an Indian entity. The most recently 
published list of federally recognized Indian tribes is found at 
68 Fed. Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003). 
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because he served as counsel on the case, fails to explain how or 
why a ruling on a motion to dismiss caused him to reasonably 
believe that he was exempt from state law forbidding hunting 
without a state permit. That issue had plainly not been 
litigated when Conway was issued.10 
Ute Indian Tribe, the other case on which the juvenile 
purports to rely, addresses the boundaries of the Uintah Valley 
Indian Reservation, attempting to resolve a conflict raised by a 
United States Supreme Court decision that conflicted with an 
earlier Tenth Circuit decision. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 
114 F.3d 1513. In this case, the trial court was never asked to 
rule on any boundary issue, and there is no boundary issue 
currently before the Court in this appeal.11 
The juvenile has inadequately briefed the issue of mistake 
of law for appellate review. Moreover, he seeks to establish his 
defense by relying on a proclamation that does not fall within 
the ambit of the mistake statute and on written opinions that do 
10
 Subsequently, the federal district court granted the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, noting expert testimony 
that the Timpanogos merged with the Utes and now have no rights 
on the Reservation other than as Ute tribal members, and holding 
that the Timpanogos have no legally cognizable aboriginal right 
to hunt and fish on land reserved for the Ute Indians. 
See addendum G at 1-2, 11. 
11
 The parties agreed that the deer was taken in Uintah 
County, in Indian Country. The location was within the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, in the southern 
portion that was previously the Uncompahgre Reservation. It is 
about 30 miles from the current Uintah Valley Reservation. R. 
83-84. 
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not support the propositions he asserts, much less the reasonable 
reliance he claims. For these reasons, the juvenile court 
properly rejected his mistake of law defense. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COMMON LAW RULE OF INFANCY 
CITED BY THE JUVENILE DOES NOT 
APPLY TO A JUVENILE COURT 
ADJUDICATION, WHICH IS A CIVIL 
PROCEEDING THAT RESULTS NOT IN A 
CONVICTION BUT IN CIVIL 
ADJUDICATION 
In a brief and largely undeveloped argument, the juvenile 
asserts that, because of his youth, he is presumed incompetent to 
commit a crime unless proven otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Br. of Aplt. at 62. The juvenile court dismissed this argument 
summarily. R. 32 at addendum A. 
The court gave this argument its due. The statute on which 
the juvenile relies, governing persons under fourteen not being 
criminally responsible, provides: 
A person is not criminally responsible for 
conduct performed before he reaches the age 
of fourteen years. This section shall in no 
way limit the jurisdiction of or proceedings 
before the juvenile courts of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-301 (West 2004). 
In this case, the juvenile was not held criminally 
responsible for any conduct occurring before he reached the age 
of fourteen. Indeed, he was not convicted of any crime. Rather, 
within the civil juvenile court system, a judge found that the 
petition alleging he had unlawfully taken protected wildlife was 
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true. This juvenile adjudication is fundamentally different than 
a conviction in adult criminal court. 
The law is well-settled that "Utah's juvenile court 
proceedings are civil in nature and are not intended to punish 
youth." In the matter of N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 851 (Utah App. 
1989) (citations omitted). Because the proceedings are civil, 
they do not result in "convictions." Maintaining the civil 
nature of juvenile court proceedings "furthers a reasonable state 
interest in preventing youth offenders, who are still in their 
formative years, from accruing a criminal record." State v. 
Schofield, 2002 UT 132, 516, 63 P.3d 667. 
The Juvenile Court Act is explicit in ensuring the civil 
nature of.its proceedings. It clearly provides that, except in 
cases involving the certification of serious youth offenders, 
"proceedings in minor's cases shall be regarded as civil 
proceedings with the court exercising equitable powers." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-117(l) (West 2004). It further states: -"A minor 
may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except 
as provided in [the statutory sections governing serious youth 
offenders,] and in cases involving traffic violations." Id. at 
§78-3a-117(3). 
Because the juvenile's case was adjudicated in a civil 
court, which exercised equitable powers, it did not result in a 
criminal conviction. He was not held criminally liable for his 
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conduct. Consequently, the juvenile court correctly rejected his 
claim of incompetency based upon his youth. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the 
juvenile's adjudication on one count of wanton destruction of 
wildlife, a third degree felony if committed by an adult 
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UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
920 East Hwy 40 
Vernal, UT 84078 
(435) 789-9335 
255 S State St 
PO Box 1286 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
(435) 722-0235 
21554 W 9000 S 
PO Box 990 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
(435) 738-0105 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
COLTONREBER 
DOB: 12/30/88 
Person(s) under eighteen years of age 
ORDER 
Case Number: 170075 
Judge Larry A. Steele 
This matter came before the Juvenile Court on the Minor's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Li 
support of the minor's motion, the minor has filed extensive memoranda. In addition, the issues raised by the 
minor have been extensively briefed and argued in the Eighth District Court in the parallel matter of the minor's 
father who was charged with aiding and abetting the minor in the commission of the same offense. In response 
to the minor's motion, the State has filed a memorandum and copies of the extensive briefs filed in and the 
rulings filed by the District Court. After reviewing the new material filed by the minor and the pleadings and 
rulings from the District Court matter, the Court is ready to rule. 
The State bears the burden of showing that the offense occurred within the boundaries of the State of Utah and 
Uintah County, the minor has the burden to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that he is an "Indian" under 
the Rogers test. One of the primary differences between this matter and the matter of the father in the District 
Court is the degree to which the minor may have Indian blood. The father having 1/16 Indian blood through his 
mother and no Indian blood through his father, the minor would have 1/32 Indian blood, not a sufficient degree 
to make the minor an "Indian" for the purposes of jurisdiction. As ruled by the District Court and considering 
the minor's status, the area in question is not within an area over which the Federal Government has exclusive 
jurisdiction. The Court does not accept the minor's arguments on competence, mistake and other arguments as 
a basis for lack of jurisdiction. 
IT IS HEREBY THE ORDER that the minor's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is denied. The 
matter shall proceed to trial as scheduled. 
Filed: fsfaslrOlf} \ ^ 0 6 ^ 
By: A^OUiWy^l 
Copy mailed, First Class, postage prepaid: 
To:Kjd6Ae( rt/OAis-ton-
t^t^£hsov-\ -ZPRo-ftfce ko x 
*y- A - 0 \ArtyA o^Kuck (, TJXA 
Dated: A/WcJL, \^ l^^M 




EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
920 East Hwy 40 
Vernal, UT 84078 
(435) 789-9335 
255 S State St 
PO Box 1286 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
(435) 722-0235 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
COLTONREBER 
DOB: 07/07/2007 
Person(s) under eighteen years of age 
ORDER 
Case Number: 170075 
21554 W 9000 S 
PO Box 990 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
(435) 738-0105 
-*4s < w ^ 
mv$2m 
1 / ^ ^BPUTY 
This matter came before the Court for Trial on the above matter this 15th day of March, 2004. Present 
vas the above minor, his father, mother, and counsel, Mr. Mike Hummiston; Mr. Ed Peterson, Deputy County 
\ttorney and a number of witnesses and spectators. 
Ed Johnson, Officer Terry Smith, and Johnny Reber were called as witnesses. 
The minor renewed his objection to the jurisdiction of this Court. The issue of jurisdiction has been 
previously ruled upon. 
- The minor objected to the amended information. The information was amended to include that the 
animal was a trophy animal because the rack was over 24 inches. The Court invited the minor to demonstrate 
wherein he would be prejudiced by the amendment. He had notice of the statutory provision cited in the prior 
Information. The deer antlers were available for examination by the minor and counsel. Counsel had even 
stipulated to the width of the antlers being greater than 24 inches. The Court found there was no prejudice in 
proceeding with the amended Information. 
The Court offered to further consider any prejudice which the minor may identify during the trial and 
reconsider the motion or bifurcate the proceedings and give the minor additional time to prepare to present any 
additional evidence or matters. After the trial began, there was no discussion of further prejudice and no request 
to bifurcate or for additional time to present further evidence or matters. 
Having heard such oral testimony as the parties chose to introduce; examined the exhibits; heard oral 
argument, the Court makes the following findings, based on the credible evidence and the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom. The Court makes each of these findings beyond a reasonable doubt: 
On or about October 27, 2004, Ed Johnson, a biologist of 17 years for the State of Utah, Division of 
Wildlife Resources, was doing a chronic wasting disease study for deer at Duck Rock which is at the end of the 
pavement at the south end of Bonanza Highway within Uintah County. A green Chevrolet or GMC pickup with 
license # 473 JFN stopped and the occupants spoke to him. In the back of the vehicle was a buck Mule deer 
which had large 3 point antlers. Mr. Johnson was familiar with Utah game licenses and tags. This deer did not 
have a tag or permit. Mr Johnson asked the vehicle to follow him into the Vernal office of Wildlife Resource 
Services. He met up with Officer Terry Smith at the intersection of Highway 40 and the Bonanza Highway and 
continued on along with Officer Smith following into the Vernal office. He never lost sight of the deer until 
Officer Smith took custody of the animal in Vernal. Officer Smith is a Conservation Officer for the Division of 
Wildlife Resources and has been ^i officer for 16 years. 
Officer Smith took custody of the deer, removed and put an evidence tag on the antlers, which antlers 
have been in his continuous custody or in evidence lockers under his control ever since October 27, 2002. The 
antlers were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. The parties stipulated a photograph shall be substituted for the 
antlers. The parties stipulated that the "antlers which were attached to the buck mule deer taken by Officer 
Terry Smith from the vehicle in which the Defendant was an occupant on the 27th day of October 2002 have an 
outside antler measurement of 24 and 3/4 inches." Mule deer such as the one taken are protected wildlife. A 
deer, such as this one, having a rack over 24 inches wide is a trophy animal. 
After arriving at the vernal office, Officer Smith spoke to all occupants of the green pickup, Colton 
Reber; his father, Rickie Reber; his uncle, Johnny Reber; and Johnny's grandson, Quintin Huber. Colton stated 
to Officer Smith that this was his first deer. Officer Smith did not include this admission in his report. Mr. 
Rickie Reber stated that his son, Colton, had shot the deer at about 5:00 PM that day. The father stated that the 
deer was killed just east of Bitter Creek and the King's Well Road. Mr. Reber stated to Officer Smith that he 
and his son had gone out hunting and his son, Colton, had killed his first deer. He was out there to assist Colton 
hunt and was in the process of transporting the deer back to his brother's house. They were in his brother's 
truck. 
The conversation with Mr. Reber and son, Colton, took place approximately 8:00 PM in the evening on 
October 27, 2002. The condition of the deer was consistent with the time of the kill and was consistent with the 
manner in which Mr. Reber indicated the deer had been killed. Officer Smith is familiar with the boundaries of 
Uintah County within the State of Utah and the area just east of Bitter Creek on King's Well Road is within 
Uintah County. Officer Smith is familiar with the road all the way to Duck Rock (15-20 miles) all of which is 
within Uintah County. 
The hunters were not "100% sure" if they were legal or not, but argued that they had a right to hunt 
there. They did not have a Utah permit. They did present a paper which said "Timpanogas Tribe Subsistence 
Hunt 2002". The hunters stated they were members of the Timpanogas Tribe. 
The uncle, Johnny Reber, was present during the hunt, but did not have Colton and Rickie always in 
sight. He did not see Colton shoot the deer, but when he caught up with Colton and Rickie, they had the deer 
and there was blood on Colton and Rickie from cleaning and transporting the deer. 
The State asked the Court to make findings required by Utah vs. Pavne, 892 Pd 1032 (Utah 1995). The 
offense occurred within the exterior boundaries of the State of Utah. The offense occurred within Uintah 
bounty. The offense and required elements of the offense occurred outside the boundaries of the Ute Indian 
•eservation and any other Indian reservation. As previously ruled, the minor would have 1/32 Indian blood, not 
i sufficient degree to make the minor an "Indian" for the purposes of jurisdiction. The area in question is not 
vithin an area over which an Indian tribe or the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction. The area in 
luestion is an area over which the State of Utah has jurisdiction. 
The evidence was, for the most part, un-rebutted. The testimony of Johnny was presented and was 
irgued by minor's counsel to raise a question as to who killed the deer. The testimony that Johnny did not keep 
Bolton in sight and never saw Colton kill the deer, does little to rebut other evidence that Colton did kill the 
leer. Johnny also testified that when he returned to the father and Colton, they had the deer and had blood on 
hem. The Court credits the testimony of Ed Johnson and Officer Terry Smith. In evaluating their testimony, 
he Court found them to be candid, truthful and largely un-rebutted. Officer Smith didn't include Colton's 
dmission in his report, but he did include the father's admission. It appears to have been generally accepted, 
yho killed the deer, Colton, the primary question and discussion related to jurisdiction. 
The above minor, Colton ivdber, on or about tne z/~* aay 01 uciooei ^uwz, m umuui ^uum^, uunv x^ 
Jtah, did commit Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, an act in violation of UCA §23-20-4 and Section 
> 3-20-3(1), a third degree felony, by shooting, injuring, killing, taking, possessing and transporting protected 
vildlife. Colton possessed protected wildlife unaccompanied by a valid license, permit, tag, certificate of 
egistration, bill of sale, or invoice. Colton did so with intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. It was 
Bolton's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct and cause the result. It was Ms first deer. The 
)rotected wildlife, the deer, which was captured, injured or destroyed was a trophy animal. 
The parties disagreed on the degree to which the minor must know of the wrongfulness of his conduct to 
form the requisite intent. Nothing in the definition of "willful" requires scienter. Willful, when applied to the 
ntent with which an act is done or omitted, implies a willingness to commit the act. It does not require an intent 
;o violate the law or to injure another or acquire any advantage. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 
Mien more is required, the legislature so states, for example: 
UCA 23-20-27. Alteration of license, permit, tag or certificate a misdemeanor. 
Any person who at any time alters or changes in any manner, with intent to defraud, any license, 
permit, tag or certificate of registration issued under provisions of this code or action of the 
Wildlife Board is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the minor did commit wanton destruction of protected and 
trophy wildlife in violation of UCA §23-20-4 and Section 23-20-3(1), a third degree felony. The disposition or 
sentencing will be stayed for a period of thirty (30) days within which time the minor may file a written notice 
of appeal. If appealed, the disposition will be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. If the matter is not 
appealed, a dispositional hearing shall be set after thirty (30) days has elapsed. This matter was transferred to 
the Eighth District Juvenile Court for "adjudication and disposition". If and when appropriate, disposition will 
occur in the Eighth District rather than in the First District Juvenile Court. 
F i l e d L ^ ^ l 1^, ZOO1-/ . Dated: 3 " ^ ^ ^ ^ 7 
vy-ftmcretf-c Oidnm ><75>> 
Copy mallei First Class, postage prepaid: BY THE C O i p R j , ^ Jr^^"' ^ 
^•&d fbhstson 
hfllctoef U l4umi$idYi 
RioKic Rel?er ,, ,
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§ 1151. Indian country defined 
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Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, 
the term "Indian country", as used in this chapter, means 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation, 
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the 
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired 
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a 
state, and 
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
O O O O O — -
State of Utah/ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Manuel Lucero, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 860213-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Garff and Greenwood. AUG £T 1987 
8feO£/3-CA 
PER CURIAM: 
Timothy M. bhea 
Glerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeal* 
Defendant Manual Lucero appeals his conviction of making 
false material statements, a second degree felony under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-502 (1978). He alleges that because he is an Indian 
and associates with the Ute Indian Tribe, and because the crime 
was committed in "Indian country/1 the state court is deprived of 
jurTsdiction over him. 
Appellant had the burden to persuade the^  trial court that he 
was an "Indian" within the intended purview o'f 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 
-53. According to the record/ this he failed to do. Such facts 
which may be relevant, but evidence of which is absent here, 
include: preponderance of Indian blood, recognition by the 
federal government or by an organized tribe; and recognized 
racial status. Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77 (Wyo. 1982); 
Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okl. Cr. 1982); cf. U.S. v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.), cert, den. 444 U.S. 
859 (1979); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 2-3 (1942). 
Additionally, in his brief on appeal, appellant does not 
support his factual claims with any citation to the record on 
appeal, as required by R. Utah Ct.App. 24(a). References to the 
record are entirely absent from appellant's statement of facts as 
well as the argument section of his brief. In the absence of 
proper citations to the record supporting appellant's contentions 
on appeal, we presume regularity of the proceedings below and 
affirm the trial court. State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah 
1982); State v. Steaaell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985); State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 
287 (Utah 1986); cf. Trees v. Lewis, 56 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 8 (1986). 
Appellant has the responsibility to marshal for this Court 
those pertinent references to the record that support his 
contentions on appeal. We will not undertake a complete review 
of the multiple volume record to search out error when appellant 
fails to do so. 
We view the evidence in the record as supporting the trial 
court's determination that defendant is not an Indian for 
purposes of §§ 1152-53. 
Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
D. Aron Stanton/ Esq. 
D. Aron Stanton & Associates 
Route 1/ Box 1663 
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David L. Wilkinson 
Attorney General 
Earl F. Dorius 
Michael M. Quealy 
Assistant Attorneys General 
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Addendum E 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT .OF UTAH 
• . ' ' ' « • • • • • . 
CENTRAL DIVISION ,! 
TIMPANOGOS TRIBE, Snake Band df 
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. .. 
KEVIN CONWAY, Assistant Director, Utah 




UTE INDIAN TREE OF THE UINTAH 
AND OURAY RESERVATION, 
Defendant-Intervenor. 
' ' ' "
!




This matter is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by 
Defendant Kevin Conway, Assistant Director of the State of Utah's Division of Wildlife 
Resources, and Defehdant-Intervenor Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
(collectively "Defendants"). 
This case deals with the priority of hunting, fisMng, and gathering rights on the Ute 
Indian Tribe's Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Reservation") in the State of Utah. Plaintiff, the 
& 
self-proclaimed Timpanogos Tribe, Snake Band of Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, 
maintains in its Complaint that ithas the right to issue hunting, fishing, and gathering permits.to 
its members for use on the Reservation without interference from the Ute Indian Tribe or the 
State of Utah. It asserts this right based on its claim that its members are descendants, of the 
aboriginal Timpanogos band of Indians in Utah, which existed on the Reservation land before 
either the Ute Tribe or the Reservation were established. Plaintiff further alleges that the 
Timpanogos band of Indians in Utah was Shoshone, not Ute, and that it maintained independence 
as a Shoshone tribe before and after the Ute Tribe and the Reservation were established. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff claims that its members have superior aboriginal rights in the land's 
natural resources. 
Defendants do not recognize the Plaintiff's status as a tribe. Rather, they contend that the 
aboriginal Timpanogos band of Indians was Ute, not Shoshone, and that it merged into the 
Uintah Ute band of Indians (precursor to the Ute Tribe) in 1865. As a result of the merger, 
Defendants claim that the aboriginal Thnpanogos band ceased to maintain an identity . 
independent of the Ute Tribe and that the Ute Tribe has exclusive jurisdiction to issue pennits for 
hunting, fishing, and gathering on the Reservation. Defendants also claim that the State of Utah 
has the right to prosecute individuals who are caught hunting, fishing, or gathering on the 
Reservation without a permit issued by the Ute Tribe. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeks dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint with 
prejudice and judgment in Defendants' favor on their Joint Counterclaim (which is essentially a 
mirror image of Plaintiff s claims). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED. 
2 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe, Snake Band of Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory 
("Timpanogos Tribe") is not a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Nevertheless, Timpanogos 
Tribe claims aboriginal rights on land in Utah for its members, specifically the right to issue 
hunting, fishing, and gathering permits to its members in the area known as the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation or Uintah Valley Reservation ('^ Reservation") without interference from the State of 
Utah or the Ute Indian Tribe ("Ute Tribe"). As the basis for its claims, the Timpanogos Tribe 
alleges that its members are Shoshone, not Ute, and that it has the right to issue permits because, 
it alleges, its members are the "Indians ... for whom the [Reservation] was set apart." (Am. 
Verified Compl. fff 12-13.) It further alleges that its'members, allegedly ancestors of the 
aboriginal Shoshone in Utah, have the right to hunt, fish, and gather on the Reservation free from 
prosecution by the State for hunting, fishing, or gathering without a permit issued by the State or 
theUteTribe. 
The Ute Tribe asserts that it, not Timpanogos Tribe, has the exclusive right to issue* 
permits for hunting, fishing and gathering on the Reservation and that permits issued by the 
Timpanogos Tribe are not valid. The State of Utah asserts that the Timpanogos Tribe does not 
have the authority to issue such permits. Further, it does not recognize the Timpanogos Tribe-
issued permits as valid and intends to prosecute (or already has prosecuted) anyone (including 
members of the Timpanogos Tribe) for hunting, fishing, or gathering within the Reservation 
without a valid permit. 
The Defendants claim that the Timpanogos Tribe is trying to re-write history The State 
3. 
and the Ute Tribe assert that the Timpanogos Tribe1 was actually one of five bands of Utes that 
merged to form the Uintah Utes, who later, along with the Uncompahgre and White River Bands 
of Utes, joined together to form what is known today as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation. The Ute Tribe claims exclusive jurisdiction over the Reservation, which 
jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribal Business Committee, the Ute Tribe's elected governing 
body, through the Ute Tribe Constitution* 
In support of their argument, the Defendants point to a series of bindings of Fact** in two 
1957 Indian Claims Commission ('ICC") decisions in the matter of Uintah Ute Indians of Utah 
v. United States, that, Defendants allege, conclusively establish that the Timpanogos merged 
with the Uintah Utes and thereafter ceased to exist independently of the Ute Tribe. See Uintah 
Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, Docket No. 44 (ICC Feb. 21,1957), attached as Ex. 2 to 
Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Sumin. J. (hereinafter 'Docket No. 44"); Uintah Ute 
Indians of Utah v. United States. Docket No. 45 (ICC Feb. 21,1957), attached as Ex. 3 to Defs/ 
Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Docket No. 45"). 
Obviously, the factual findings of ICC are at odds with the claims the Timpanogos Tribe 
makes in this case. Pointing to the ICC decisions, the Defendants assert that the Timpanogos 
Tribe's, claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. But 
Timpanogos Tribe contends, among other things, that the Ute Tribe may not rely on the ICC 
decisions as precedent because of a. 1960 stipulation between the Ute Tribe and the United States 
stating that the "final judgment [in the two 1957 ICC decisions]... shall not be construed as an 
defendants do not concede that the Timpanogos are a tribe. (See Defs.' Mot. at 2 n.l.) 
4 
admission of either party, for the purpose of precedent or argument, in any other case." See PL's '• 
Mem. in Opp'n to Mot for Summ. J. at 15-16 (quoting Apr. 22,1960 Stipulation for Entry of . 
Final Judgment in the case of Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, attached as Ex. A to 
PL's Mem.). 
In addition to their issue preclusion defense, the Defendants submitted two expert reports 
purporting to set forth the history of the Ute Tribe and the.relationship of the Timpanpgos to the 
Utes. (See Expert Report of Floyd A. O'Neii, Ph.D. (Historian), attached as Ex, 4 "to Defs.' 
Mem. in.Supp. of Mot for Summ. J.; Expert Report of Joel Janetski, Ph.D. (Anthropologist and 
Archaeologist), attached as Ex. 5 to Defs/ Man. in Siipp.) Both experts conclude that the 
Timpanogos merged with the Utes many years ago, that presently there is no separate tribe 
known as the Timpanogos Tribe, that the Timpanpgos are Utes, not Shoshone, and that the 
Timpanogos, other than as members of the Ute Tribe, have no independent rights on the 
Reservation. (See id. at.2.) Both of Defendants' experts opine that historical, anthropological, 
and archaeological documentation shows, that Plaintiffs'' allegations are simply wrong. (See 
O'Neii Expert Report at 2 ("The historical evidence is all to the contrary."); Janetski Expert
 t 
Report at 2 ("There is no anthropological, archaeological or historical evidence that supports • 
such claims.9*).) They also conclude that the ICC Findings of Fact in the 1957 decisions are fiilly 
supported by the historical recordand are accurate. (6'Neil Expert Report at 3'r Janetski Expert 
Report at 2.) 
Timpanogos Tribe did not submit its own expert reports in rebuttal, but it did submit 
affidavit testimony and other documentation in an effort to rebut the conclusions of the 
Defendants* experts. Defendants maintain that because Timpanogos Tribe did not submit an 
5 
expert witness report in rebuttal, as a matter of law the Plaintiff cannot prevail over the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. According to the Defendants, the issues raised are 
beyond the experience of the ordinary layperson and therefore require expert testimony. That is, 
the Defendants contend that because two expert witnesses came to a conclusion favoring the 
position of the Defendants, and because Timpanogos Tribe did not present contrary evidence in 
the forin of an expert report, Defendants ate per se entitled to summary judgment. 
The court analyzes each set of arguments in turn below. • 
ANALYSIS 
Legal Standard 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers tp interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.m Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,250-51 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.. 144 R3d 664,670 
(10th Cir. 1998), ''The mere existence of a scintilla of evidencein support of the plaintiffs 
position will be insufficient [to overcome a motion for summary judgment]; there must be 
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 
252. See also Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co.» 181 F3d 1171,1175 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Amere 




Defendants' Collateral Estoppel/Issue Preclusion Defense 
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "'[w]hen an issue of 
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be' 
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit"' United States v. Botefuhr. 309 F.3d 
1263,1282 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson. 397 U.S. 436,443 (1970)). The 
Defendants bear the burden of establishing the four elements of issue preclusion. Adams v.. 
Kinder-Morgan. Inc.. 340 F.3d 1083,1093 (10th Cir. 2003). Those elements are: "'(I) the issue 
previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior 
action has been fully adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is 
invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) theparty against 
whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
action."' Botefuhr. 309 F.3dat 1282 (quoting Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190,1197 (10th 
Cir. 2000)). . 
Thelessential issue in this case is whether the members of thie Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe 
are actually ancestors of the Timpanogos, one of five historic Ute bands, and whether that band 
merged into the Uintah Ute Band of Indians, which then ultimately became the Ute Tribe for 
whom the Reservation was set aside. The 1957 ICC decisions addressed similar, if not identical, 
factual issues regarding'aboriginal title to the Reservation and the make-up of the Uintah Ute 
Band through a determination of which smaller Indian bands merged into the larger Uintah Band. 
For example, the ICC found that the Shoshone and Utes were "separate and distinct." (Docket 
No. 44 at Finding of Fact No. 5.) The ICC also found that the Timpanogos merged into the 
Uintah Utes in 1865. (Id at Finding of Fact No. 4; Docket No. 45 at Finding of Fact No. 3.) The 
7 ' 
. ICC found that the Uintah Utes band, along with the Uncompahgre and White River Bands* of 
Utes, occupied the Reservation and are'now known as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation. (Docket No. 44 at p. 32.) All of these issues are before this court. 
The parties in the ICC litigation were the United States and the Ute Tribe. The State was 
not involved in the litigation, but it appears to agree with and rely upon the findings of fact issued 
by the ICC in the 1957 decisions. The question becomes whether Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe 
was a party to the 1957 litigation or was a party in privity with the Ute Tribe in 1957. 
Defendants contend that Timpanogos Tribe was a party to the litigation (through the Ute Tribe) 
because the Timpanogos merged into the Ute Tribe in 1865. But this begs the question facing 
the court now and presents a circular argument fi.e;. the Defendants' privity argument assumes 
the'very fact it must prove - that the Plaintiff actually merged with and became part of the Ute 
Tribe in 1865, thereby ceasing to maintain an independent identity after that point). 
Given the unique circumstances of this case, the court finds that the Defendants have . 
failed to establish the third element of issue preclusion! Accordingly, the Timpanogos Tribe is 
not collaterally estopped by the ICC decisions from raising the issues now before the court.2 
2The court does not agree with the Timpanogos Tribe's argument that the 1960 
Stipulation between the U.S. and the Ute Tribe (in which the parties finally settled the litigation 
and agreed that the final judgment of the ICC "shall not be construed as an admission of either 
party, for the purpose of precedent or argument, in any other case" (Ex. A. to PL's Opp'n Mem.)) 
prevents the Ute Tribe from relying on the ICC decisions as precedent See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp 
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship. 513 U.S. 18,26-27 (1994) ('"Judicial precedents are* 
presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the-
property of private litigants and should stand unless a court finds that the public interest would be 
served by a vacatur,'") (internal citation omitted). In any event, Timpanogos Tribe's argument 
does not affect the State's right to cite to the ICC decisions, because the State was not a party to 
the Stipulation. Further, as noted above, the court is not allowing the Defendants to rely on the 
ICC findings of fact as evidence, . 
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Nor will the court take judicial notice of the ICC Findings of Fact, as the Defendants 
suggest it should,3 because that would essentially undermine the doctrine of collateral estoppel' 
and be contrary to the Federal Rules of Evidence.. Rule 201 provides that "[a] judicially noticed 
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned/' Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). See 
" also Tavlor v. Charter Med Corp.. 162 F.3d 827, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1998) ("court cannot take 
judicial notice of the factual findings of another court... because (1) such findings do not 
constitute facts 'not subject to reasonable dispute' within the meaning of Rule 201; and (2) 'were 
[it] permissible for a court to take judicial notice pf a fact merely because it had been found to be. 
true in some other action, the doctrine of collateral- estoppel would be superfluous.'") (internal 
citations omitted); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp.* 128 F.3d 1074,1082 
n.6 (7th Cir. 1997) ("courts generally cannot take notice of findings of fact from other 
proceedings for the truth asserted therein because these findings are disputable and usually are 
disputed."); Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 18 F.3d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing to Fed. 
R. Evid 201(b), and noting that taking judicial notice of anything but a '"universal truth" 
established by common knowledge, or "certain facts, which from their nature are not properly the 
subject of testimony," would be improper). Indeed, Defendants essentially admit the facts at 
issue in this case are not common knowledge, because they argue that the subject necessarily * 
3See Defs/ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 12 (quoting language in Havasupai 
Tribe v. United States. 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), aflPd, 943 F.2d 32(9th Cir. 1991), 
which said that the "ICC proceedings... are an appropriate subject for judicial notice").. 
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requires expert testimony, Besides, it is clear that the factual issues before the ICC were subject 
to reasonable dispute and were determined after consideration of much documentary evidence, 
• This creates a potential problem for the Defendants, because Defendants' Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts relies in part on the ICC Findings of Fact as evidentiary support for 
their position. fSee.e.g.. Deft.* Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.' at 5-12,) But Defendants also 
rely on their expert reports, which do support Defendants' statement of facts. 
Expert Evidence 
Plaintiffs Failure to Present Expert Rebuttal Evidence 
. To the extent that Defendants are contending that because the Plaintiffhas failed to 
submit expert rebuttal evidence, as a matter of law Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, 
the court disagrees. The cases cited by Defendants - Randolph v. Collectramatic. Mc, 590 F.2d 
844, 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1979), and Keller v. Albright 1 F. Supp. 2d 1279,1281-82 (D. Utah " 
1997), affU 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998) - d o not support such an argument. 
Rather, the issue is whether the Plaintiffhas presented admissible evidence that creates a 
genuine issue of material fact that must be tried by a jury. 
Defendants' Expert Evidence and Plaintiffs Rebuttal Evidence 
Defendants' Evidence 
Defendants' experts provide strong evidence to support Defendants' position.4 (See 
Expert Report of Floyd A. O'Neil, Ph.D. (Historian), attached as Ex. 4 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ' 
of Mot. for Summ. J.; Expert Report of Joel Janetski, Ph.D. (Anthropologist and Archaeologist), 
4The Plaintiffhas not challenged the qualifications or methodology of the Defendants' 
expert witnesses. 
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attached as Ex. 5 to Defs/ Mem. in Supp.) Both experts conclude that the Timpanogos merged 
with the Utes many years ago, that presently there is no separate tribe known as the Timpanogos 
Tribe, that the Timpanogos are Utes, not Shoshone, and that the Timpanogos, other than as 
members of the Ute Tribe, have no rights on the Reservation,' See.id. at 2. Both of Defendants' 
experts opine that the historical, anthropological, and archaeological documentation shows that 
Plaintiffs* allegations are simply wrong. (See 6'Neil Expert Report at 2 ("The historical 
evidence is all to the contrary."); Janetski Expert Report at 2 ('There is no anthropological,-
archaeological or historical evidence that supports such claims.").) They also conclude that the 
ICC Findings of Fact in the .1957 decisions are fully supported by the historical record and are 
accurate. (O'Neil Expert Report at 3; Janetski Expert Report at 2.) 
Plaintiff's Evidence 
In opposition, Plaintiff submitted the following evidence: Affidavit of Mary Meyer (Ex; E 
to PL's Mem. In Opp'n (hereinafter "Opp'n Menu")), Affidavit of Dave Montes (Ex. J to Opp'n ' 
Mem.), an excerpt from the 1776 Dominguez-Escalante Journal (Ex. G to Opp'n Mem.), the 
October 3,1861 Executive Order setting aside the Uintah Valley Reservation (Ex. H to Opp'n 
Mem.), an 1863 map purporting to show the boundaries of Shoshone territories (attached to the 
decision in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States. 95 Ct. CI. 642 (1942), 
affd 324 U.S. 335 (1945), and one OT more 1863 United States treaties with the Shoshone) (Ex. 
L to Opp'n Mem.), a copy of the unratified June 8,1865 Spanish Fork Treaty (Ex. I to Opp'n 
Mem.), the Utah State Tax Commission Apr. 27, 2000 Decision in the matter ofMarvMeverv. 
Customer Serv. Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n (Ex, C to Opp'n Mem.), the State's Pre-
Hearing Memorandum in the same Utah State Tax Commission matter (Ex. D to Opp'n Mem.), a 
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list of Timpanogos Tribe membership eligibility requirements (Ex. F to Opp'n Mem.), and a" 
Judgment issuedby the Ute Tribal Court (Ex. K to Opp'n Mem.). • 
The Mary Meyer and Dave Montes Affidavits 
In her affidavit, Mary Meyer states, among other things, that she is a member of the 
Timpanogos Tribe'and presently is its Chief Executive Officer. (MeyesfAff. ff 2-3.) She also 
makes the following assertion: "I descend from Shoshonean and Northern iPaiute Ancestors. I 
am not Ute. I have no Ute Indian blood, nor have I ever been enrolled with the Ute Indian Tribe, 
a Federal Corporation." QMLf8.) Similarly, Dave Montes* in his affidavit, states that he is a 
Timpanogos Indian rather than a Ute, that he is a member of the Timpanogos Tribe, that he has 
never been a Ute Tribal member, that his children, mother, grandfather Leo Pritchett, and great 
grandfather Chief Tabby were never Ute Tribal members, that the Uintah Valley Reservation has 
always been his home, and that his great grandfather "spent most of his time in the Rock Creek 
area and always claimed the Wasatch Front as his home." (Montes Aff. flf 1,3-5, 7, 8-9.) * 
Ms. Meyer's and Mr. Montes' personal statements offer nothing more than anecdotal. 
information and are not relevant to the questions facing the court, particularly the question of 
whether the Timpanogos band of Indians merged with th$ Ute Indian Tribe, thereby ceasing to 
exist as an independent entity, §ee United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States. 253 F,3d 
543, 548 (10th Cir. 2001): 
[The United Tribe of Shawnee Indians' CUTSI")] argument assumes the very 
factual issue at the heart of this litigation. UTSI can only prevail on its contention 
if we accept its bare assertion that it is the present-day embodiment of the 
Shawnee Tribe. The only evidence even arguably offered by UTSI to support this 
proposition is the fact that UTSI is based on land patented to Mr^  Oyler's ancestor 
by the Treaty. While this fact may establish that Mr. Oyler's ancestor was a 
member of the Shawnee tribe and that Mr. Oyler is therefore a descendant of a 
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tribal member, it says nothing about whether UTSI has maintained its identity 
with the Shawnee tribe and has continued to exercise that tribe's sovereign 
authority up to the present day. . 
Id at 548 (emphasis added). 
The Utah State Tax Commission Proceeding 
Plaintiff raises a collateral estoppel argument when it relies on documents in the April 27, 
2000 Utah State Tax Commission case of Marv Mever v. Customer Serv. Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n (Appeal No. 98-1181), to support its position. (See PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-8,10,12, • 
14,17-22; Ex. C to PL's Opp'n Mem (Final Decision of Utah State Tax Commission); Ex. D to 
PL's Opp'n Mem. (State of Utah's Pre-Hearing Memorandum in tax proceeding).) According to 
Plaintiff, . 
The Timpanogos Tribe was historically recognized as a separate and distinct tribe 
and was of Shoshone [descent].,.. Moreover, recently in the case of Meyer v. 
Utah State Tax Comm %... the State of Utah and the Utah Tax Commission 
recognized Mary Meyer, the Chief Executive Officer of the Timpanogos Tribe, as 
"a member of the San Pitch [B]and of Timpanogos [T]ribe of Snake lhdians[,]" 
"an Indian member of the Shoshone Nation[,]" and sinot of Ute ancestryf.]" 
. . .This recognition is prima facie evidence of the Plaintiffs distinct identity 
• [today]. 
' (PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted).) In the Mever case, the issue was whether 
. Ms. Meyer was exempt from the requirement to pay jproperty taxes on her car because she was an 
Indian (non-Ute) living on the Reservation. 
Plaintiffs collateral estoppel argument is not persuasive here for a number of reasons. 
.First, the Ute Tribe was not a party to the litigation, so at a minimum, only one of two 
Defendants would, in theory, be collaterally estopped. 
Second, the issue of Ms. Meyer's ancestry was not actually litigated. That is, the State of 
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Utah had no reason to dispute Ms. Meyer's assertion that she is not a Ute, because her assertion 
meant that the State would prevail on its claim for property tax from a non-tribal member; As 
Defendants note, "Ms. Meyer could have said she was of any ethnicity, heritage, or group other 
than Ute and the State would have had no reason to contest her' claim." (Defs.' Reply Mem. at 
9.) Accordingly, the court disagrees with Plaintiffs overly broad statement that determination of 
'*Ms. Meyer's ancestry [as a Shoshone] was necessary to the Utah State Tax Commission's • 
judgment" (Seg PL's Opp'n Mem. at 20.) ' 
Third, the issue actually litigated in the tax commission case was "whether the state may 
tax personal property of an Indian who lives on a reservation, but is not ain enrolled member of 
. the governing tribe." (Utah State Tax Comm'n Final Decision at 6 (Ex..C to PL's Opp'n 
Mem.).) The Mever decision assumes the truth of the proposition being challenged by the 
Plaintiff in this matter, namely that the Ute Tribe is the exclusive governing tribe of the 
Reservation, (See id. at 5-7; see also State of Utah's Pre-Hearing Mem. in Meyer at 2 ("The Ute 
Tribe is the governing Tribe over the lands of the Ute Indian Reservation.") (attached as Ex. D to 
PL's Opp'n Mem.).). The Utah State Tax Commission administrative court did not decide the 
same issue facing the court today. 
Finally, as noted by the Defendants, <cthe Commission would hot have jurisdiction to . 
adjudicate the Timpanogos' existence." See, e.g.. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway. 286 F:3d 1195, 
1203 (10th Cir. 2002) ('It is rudimentary that 'Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be 
extinguished only with federal consent' and that the termination of the protection that federal 
law; treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is 'exclusively the province of federal 
. law."') (quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe. 442 U.S. 653, .670-71 (1979)), 
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The 1776 Dominguez-Escalante Journal, the 1861 Executive Order, 
1863 Map of Shoshone Territory, and the Unratified 1865 Spanish 
Fork Treaty 
Plaintiff cites to these historical documents (Exs. G, H, I, and L to PL's Opp'n Mem.) to 
support its position that the Timpanogos Indians historically were recognized as a separate and 
distinct tribe of Shoshone descent that was induced to inhabit (and did inhabit) the area which 
became known as the Reservation. (See PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-10,12-14,26.) The Plaintiff 
claims that these documents establish its members' aboriginal rights and that such aboriginal 
rights are superior to the Ute Tribe's rights and jurisdiction. 
The excerpt from the Dominguez-Escalante Journal notes the characteristics and location 
of the Timpanogos band of Indians in what was then Utah Territory. {Journal Excerpt (Ex. G to 
PL's Opp'n Mem.).) Plaintiff cites to this for the proposition that the "Timpanogos Tribe was • 
historically recognized as a separate and distinct tribe and was of Shoshone [descent]." (Pl/s 
Opp'n Mem. at 7-8,12-13.) But the excerpt from the Journal makes no mention of Shoshone 
Indians. Moreover, it is not disputed that a separate Timpanogos band existed in 1776. (See 
Defs.' Reply Mem, at 5-6.) This piece of evidence does nothing to contradict the Defendants' 
evidence that the Timpanogos band merged into the Uintah Ute band of Indians in 1865 and 
ceased to maintain an identity independent of the Ute Tribe. 
The 1861 Executive Order (later approved by an 1864 Act of Congress) set aside a 
reservation in the Uintah Valley "for the permanent settlement and exclusive occupation of such 
of the different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory as may be induced to inhabit the same." 
(Oct. 3,1861 Exec. Order (Ex. H to Pi's Opp'n Mem.); Act of May 5,1864, ch. 77,13 Stat. 63, 
. § 2.) Plaintiff cites to this in support of the unremarkable proposition that the Uintah Valley 
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Reservation was set aside as an Indian reservation by President Lincoln. (PI. 's Opp'n Mem. at • 
13.) Plaintiff then makes the inference, in conjunction with citations to the 1776 Journal and an 
unratified 1865 treaty (discussed below), that "it is undisputed and historically documented that 
the Timpanogos Tribe constituted one of the 'different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory' 
for whom the Uintah Reservation was established*" (IdLat26.) At most, giving the Plaintiff 
benefit of the doubt, this tends to show that the Reservation was established for more than one 
tribe, all of which would co-exist and have equal rights on the Reservation. Even if Plaintiff is 
arguing that it be allowed to "co-exist" with the Ute Tribe on the Reservation, it ignores later • 
historical events which suggest that the Utes were the only Indians for whom the reservation was 
set aside. For example, under the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18,1934,48 Stat. 984, the 
current Ute Tribe was formed by combining the Uintah, White River, and Uncompahgre b&nds of 
Ute Indians in 1936. Also, in 1937, the Constitution and By-Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation w;ere established with approval of the United States. See also 
Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States. 28 Fed. CI. 768, 784-85 (Fed. CL 1993) (stating that' 
"aboriginal title provides a given tribe with rights as against all except the sovereign" and "a tribe 
must prove exclusive possession of a parcel. . , . [M]ixed use of a given parcel 'precludes the 
establishment of any aboriginal title***). 
The 1863 map cited by Plaintiff purports to show Shoshone territory in Utah. Plaintiff 
relies on it to show that Shoshone Territory included the land where the Reservation was 
established. But, in the court opinion to which it was attached as an exhibit, the court notes that 
the drawn boundaries were approximate. See Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United 
States: 95 Ct. CI. 642 (Ct CL 1942). And the purpose of the 1863 treaties between the Shoshone 
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and the United States, for which the map was originally drawn, was to create peaceful relations 
between the tribe and the government, not to negotiate or establish any right or title to the 
territory indicated on the map. 
[T]he information [gathered by the agents of the government] as to the locations 
of various bands of these Indians and the area in which they lived and over which 
they roamed and hunted... was general in character and indefinite as to 
boundaries of specific areas and, also, as to specific bands or individual Indians of 
specific tribes The treaties [with the Shoshone] were intended to be, and we 
think they are, treaties of peace, and amity because the Government had very little 
reliable information as to the territory actually occupied by these [Shoshone] 
Indians. • 
Id. A map of approximate boundaries, by itself or in conjunction with the rest of Plaintiffs 
evidence, is simply not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact in this case. 
The Plaintiff also cites to the unratified 1865 Spanish Fork Treaty 'Vith the Utah, 
Yampah Ute, Pah-Vant, Sanpete Ute, Tim-P-Nogs and Cum-Nm-Bah Bands of the Utah 
Indians." (Treaty (Ex. I to PL's Opp'n Mem.) at 1 (emphasis added).) The Treaty provides in 
relevantpart that the Timpanogos were a band of Indians in Utah Territory who were induced to 
"remove to and settle upon" the reservation described as "the entire valley of the Uintah River" . 
within Utah Territory extending on both sides of said river to the crest of the first range of 
contiguous mountains on each side." QdL at 1-2.) Plaintiff cites to this in support of the 
proposition that the Timpanogos Band was distinct and did not merge with the Utes, because, it 
appears, the Timpanogos Band was represented by a separate signatory to the treaty. Aside from 
the fact that the treaty was never ratified (the Senate rejected it in 1869 so it is not a binding 
document), it also contains language that contemplates giving the group of bands as one entity 
exclusive use and occupation rights of a single piece of land. Specifically, the Treaty provides 
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that one undivided tract of land is "reserved for the exclusive use and occupation of the said 
tribes/' (Treaty art. H (Ex. I to PL's Opp'n Mem.) (emphasis added).) This language is 
inconsistent with the Timpanogos Tribe's contention that the Reservation was set aside for it, not 
for the Ute Tribe. (See^e^ Am. CompL If 12.) 
Timpanogos Tribe Eiigibffify Requirements and the 1979 Ute Tribal 
Council Decision 
The fact that a modern day entity calling itself Timpanogos Tribe maintains the eligibility 
requirements set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit F does not create a genuine issue of material fact.. 
The court must look to historical evidence to make its determination. 
• In the 1970 Ute Tribal Council decision (attached as Exhibit K to PL's Opp'n Mean.), the 
Ute Tribal Council decided that certain individuals, some of whom were apparently ancestors of 
affiant Dave Montes, did not meet the requirements for Ute Tribe membership. The tribal 
court's holding does not tell us anything other than the fact that certain relatives of Mr. Montes 
were not members of the Ute Tribe. Thisidoes not support Plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff asks the 
court to make unreasonable inferences and leap to the conclusion that because Mr. Montes and 
his ancestors are not Ute, the Plaintiff, whose members include Mr. Montes, is a Shoshone tribe 
in existence since aboriginal times and for whom the Reservation was set aside. The court will. 
not make that leap, nor will it allow a jury to do so. 
In short, Plaintiff has presented nothing more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence, which 
is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co,. 181 




For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
DATED this pjT day of January, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
-3e^4 (lo^v^OuM 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
19 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
January 25, 2005 
* * CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE OP CLERK * * 
Res 2:00-cv-00734 
True and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed 
by the clerk to the following: 
Kimberly D. Washburn, Esq. 
LAW OFFICES OF KIMBERLY D WASHBURN 
405 E 12450 S STE A 
PO BOX 1432 
DRAPER, UT 84020 
EMAIL 
Charles L. Kaiser,. Esq. 
DAVIS GRAHAM & STUBBS LLC 
1550 SEVENTEENTH ST STE 500 
DENVER, CO 80202-1550 
EMAIL 
Tod J. Smith, Esq. 
WHITING & SMITH 
1136 PEARL ST STE 203 
BOULDER, CO 80302 . 
EMAIL 
Mr. Brian L Farr, Esq. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
160 E 300 S 
PO BOX 140857 
SALT.LAKE CITY, UT 84114-0857 
EMAIL 
Jeffrey Thomas Colemere, Esq. 
SMART SCHOFIELD SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
5295 S COMMERCE DR STE 200 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
EMAIL 
alt 
I 
